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Abstract 
Depending upon the institutional framework, coral reef ecosystems and local economic 
development can be synergistic. When managed properly through local institutions, 
coral reef systems can deliver ecosystem services that create livelihoods and increase 
local prosperity in dependent communities. This study compares two community-based 
reef management institutions. One is located in a community with a reef struggling to 
recover from destructive fishing, the other in a community that has experienced a 
remarkable recovery. Using mixed methods, long-form interviews, and surveys of reef 
tourism stakeholders, this uses institutional characteristics to predict reef quality. 
Certain institutional components hypothesized to predict reef quality did not; these 
include universal membership requirements for reef stakeholders, stakeholder 
familiarity with leadership and hierarchies, and transparent decision-making and 
implementation of management policy. This means that one size fits all prescriptions for 
local reef management institutions should be viewed with caution. Instead, the success 
of management institutions may depend upon both the path toward economic 
development, access to technology that facilitates coral recovery, and communication 
of conservation strategies to tourist visitors.  
 
 
Key Words 
Ecosystem Services 
Coral Reefs 
Community Based Management  
Co-Management 
Resilience  
Institutions  
Marine Protected Areas 
 
 
Abbreviations 
TEs: Tourism Elites 
MPAs: Marine Protected Areas 
                                                         1 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Environmental Policy and Planning 77 Massachusetts Ave. Cambridge, MA 02139  & Woods Hole Marine Policy Center MS #41 Woods Hole Oceanographic Inst. Woods Hole, MA 02543  Email: k_heber1@mit.edu   
 2 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Southeast Asia is home to the world’s largest network of coral reefs. With reef 
ecosystem service values estimated at $2.3 billion U.S. annually, regional governments 
are trying to improve management (Tun et al. 2008). One method involves designing 
and implementing management institutions with interdisciplinary aims, including both 
ecological and socio-economic management goals. Reef management institutions are 
the set of rules, labor, financing, technologies, and sanctions that determine rate and 
extent of resource use (Renard 1991, White et al. 1994). Over the past decade, 
Southeast Asian nations have been adopting reef management institutions from 
national to local scales that consider stakeholder income, social norms, values, and 
culture (Tun et al. 2008).  
The primary goal for policy-makers and communities designing management 
institutions is healthy ecosystem outcomes that provide a level of ecosystem services 
that contribute to socio-economic wellbeing (Hughes et al. 2003, MEA 2003). Reef 
ecosystem services could include: fisheries production, reef tourism, buffering from 
extreme weather and storm surge, erosion protection, and cultural and aesthetic values 
(Costanza et al. 1997, Moberg and Folke 1999, Peterson and Lubchenco 1997). The 
Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network estimates that 120 million Southeast Asians 
depend directly on reefs for their sustenance and economic needs, with significant 
proportions of the population completely dependent on reefs for all aspects of their 
livelihoods (Wilkinson 2008). Beyond those who make their living off local reefs, 60% of 
Southeast Asia’s population lives on or near the coast, thus benefitting from reef 
ecosystem service delivery (Salvat 1992).  
Experts argue that there is still a profound need to improve reef management as 
it has failed to meet its primary goal (Bellwood et al. 2004). Southeast Asian reef 
ecosystems continue to decline (Hughes et al. 2003, Brown 1997, Richmond 1993).  One 
noteworthy option is to shift the focus of management institutions to reef resilience, or 
its ability to recover from man-made or natural disturbances (Bellwood et al. 2004, 
Berkes et al 2000, Berkes et al. 2003, Holling 1973). Institutions aimed at reversing 
degradation would enhance resilience as well as reef capacity to deliver ecosystem 
services to stakeholders (Cesar 2002, Costanza et al. 1997, Moberg and Folke 1999).   
This study contends that there exist specific institutional characteristics that 
facilitate ecological reef recovery and act synergistically to strengthen reef-based 
livelihoods, specifically reef tourism livelihoods. Scholars have demonstrated empirical 
links between institutions, ecological resilience and socio-economic stability of 
dependent communities (Bellwood et al. 2004, Myers et al. 2000, Nystrom et al. 2000, 
Pauly 1995, Roberts et al. 2002). Thus local management institutions are critical to 
enhancing ecosystem service delivery along with resilience of reef communities 
(Kittinger 2013, Mascia 2001).  
This paper analyzes the relationships between ecological reef outcomes that 
result from management institutions designed by reef communities. This study 
compares two Indonesian community-based coral reef management institutions, 
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examining the key differences in institutional design, and linking the differences to reef 
health outcomes. Case selection for the comparative study design controlled for several 
possible confounding variables to institutional design. Beginning with village exposure to 
destructive fishing, or the use of dynamite and cyanide methods that negatively 
impacted Southeast Asian reefs since the 1950s and later outlawed in 1985 (Badruddin 
and Gillet 1996, Pet-Soede et al. 1999). Both case villages saw decades of dynamite and 
cyanide fishing at comparable levels given their geographic proximity. Secondly, the 
timing of reef management efforts coincides, since the communities made simultaneous 
efforts to design reef management institutions following national-level conservation 
policy that outlawed destructive fishing over two decades ago. Finally, both 
communities are seeing evidence of either ecological improvement, or of institutional 
and managerial improvement around reef conservation.   
The main objective of this study is to examine the relationship between reef 
ecosystem outcomes that result from distinct institutional characteristics of local reef 
management regimes. The seven institutional building blocks examined here include: 
the presence of clear membership requirements, internal hierarchies, day-to-day 
involvement of elected leaders in management practice, transparency and knowledge of 
the leadership and their responsibilities to the institution, whether the leadership helps 
build capacity in the organization, whether all members can be elected as leaders, and 
whether the institution is autonomous or under the influence of elites.  
This study uses a mixed methods approach to develop 1) a quantitative model to 
highlight significant differences in the above-listed institutional variables in a village with 
high quality reefs compared to a village with low quality reefs and 2) in-depth accounts 
from stakeholders from long form interviews that explain significant institutional 
differences. This study uses quasi-experimental design, where the outcome (reef health) 
is viewed as a dependent variable, with the aforementioned theoretically important 
independent variables examined across case sites, controlling for confounding factors. 
Quasi-experimental designs are considered best practices for research on community-
based management of natural resources (Thomas et al. 2014). They allow for 
assessment of environmental outcomes after decades of local level management 
targeted at eliminating destructive fishing, without the need for a multi decade study.   
To operationalize the building blocks of reef management institutions, this study 
draws on the theoretical work on institutions for managing common pool resources, 
primarily on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD) (2009). 
IAD argues there are strong links between institutional designs and the health of the 
managed resource, based on hundreds of empirical studies (Ostrom 2009, Wamukota et 
al 2012). IAD also theorizes the universal building blocks of the common pool resource 
management institution, and uses these components to hypothesize subsequent 
ecosystem response. These key institutional building blocks include: the rules for entry 
and exit into management organizations (management boundaries), rules of access to 
the resource, sanctions for when rules are breached, characteristics of the biophysical 
and ecological system, and details on the community such as local values, behavior, and 
culture (Agrawal 2001, Becker and Ostrom 1995, Ostrom 1990, Ostrom 2005).  
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Institutions have also been theorized in the complex socio-ecological systems 
literature, which hypothesizes links between human systems (institutions and 
economies) and ecosystems. Socio-ecological systems are characterized by dynamic, 
non-linear relationships where sudden shifts into undesired states can occur across 
systems (Armitage et al. 2007, Berkes et al. 2003, Berkes and Folke 1998, Ingold 2000). 
The socio-ecological systems framework hypothesizes several attributes of successfully 
designed management institutions. Successful institutions can be defined in two distinct 
ways. These include 1) socioeconomic successes where stakeholders enhance their 
ability to collaboratively interact for conservation purposes (Christie 2004) or 2) 
ecological success where healthy condition of the reef and the maintenance of key 
ecological parameters occur (Hughes et al. 2003, McClanahan et al. 2006). Sometimes, 
only one type of success is present in co-managed systems (Wamukota et al. 2012, 
Christie 2004, Brooks et al. 2006). In other words, specific characteristics of 
management institutions may not necessarily cause healthier reef ecosystems, but they 
have potential to enhance the way stakeholders build relationships and collaborate 
towards sustainable stewardship of reefs (Cinner et al. 2012). Some studies have 
pointed out that privileging one definition of success over the other ignores important 
considerations of the socio-ecological system (McClanahan et al. 2009).  
Successful management institutions, using either definition of success, tend to 
have the following design characteristics according to socio-ecological systems thinking: 
participatory design that is inclusive of all stakeholders groups (Berkes et al. 1991, 
Pinkerton 1994), flexible and adaptive structure that incorporates new learning into 
management decision-making (Berkes 2007, Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004), and 
development origins within the community so that it is specially designed for conditions 
in a specific place (Olsson et al. 2004). Co-managed institutions fit these design 
characteristics for successful management institutions.  
A community-based management system is co-managed when there is a form of 
power sharing between national government and communities (Berkes 2007, Armitage 
et al 2007). The field sites in this study are co-managed reef systems. This study 
synthesizes definitions of co-management from similar studies to define co-
management as an institutional framework with: participation by local and diverse 
stakeholders; integration of reef management choices with the broader socio-economic 
needs of a community; empowerment of the community to act as resource managers; 
and employing local environmental perceptions to make management decisions (Cinner 
et al. 2009 (b), Christie 2007, Christie and White 1997, Kittinger 2013, Wells et al. 2006, 
White et al. 1994, White et al. 1994).  
Co-managed institutions are the focus in this study for several reasons. First, the 
literature has demonstrated links between co-managed reefs and sustainable coral reef 
outcomes specifically when key institutional building blocks are in place (Agrawal 2001, 
Cinner et al. 2009 (b), Cinner et al. 2012, Pomeroy 1995, Wamukota et al. 2012). Co-
managed institutions prevent degradation that would lessen the ability of ecosystem 
services to benefit communities (Grilo 2011). Other studies also demonstrate links 
between co-managed ecosystems and improved livelihoods, improved compliance with 
rules managing access, and in some cases, larger target fish species in terms of biomass 
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(Cinner et al. 2012). Therefore, improving institutional capacity is an “essential 
component of sustaining broader coral reef seascapes” (Cinner et al. 2009 (a) p. 209). 
Co-managed ecosystems improve efficiency of resource use and good governance, or 
transparency and legitimacy in management policy-making (Jentoft et al. 1998).  
Some criticism in the scholarship on co-management includes how systematic, 
empirical work linking institutions to biophysical outcomes is lacking (Cinner et al. 2012, 
Wamukota et al. 2012, Stevenson and Tissot 2014). Empirical work that includes both 
quantitative and qualitative data drawing on the experiences of stakeholder groups is 
also scarce. Lastly, that the scholarship on co-managed reefs is an underdeveloped 
causal link between institutions and reef ecosystem outcomes (Stevenson and Tissot 
2014). Despite these criticisms, there is evidence that under certain design conditions 
co-management is capable of meeting various conservation and economic development 
goals (Grilo 2011, Christie and White 2007, Cinner et al. 2005, Cinner and Huchery 
2014). In addition, institutional analysis is a critical way of addressing a lingering 
criticism of co-managed institutions relevant to this study. This involves the problematic 
use of the term community, where some argue it is a misleading term that erroneously 
suggests communities are homogenous entities (Broisus et al 1998, Berkes 2011). The 
term masks internal complexities, such as socio-economic differences between well-
connected elites compared to low-income community members. Institutional analysis is 
a way to break down complex socio-economic divisions, and instead look at rule making 
patterns and enforcement mechanisms to sidestep the problem of theorizing the 
community as a homogenous entity (Ostrom 1990).  
This study builds on the findings of previous work detailing co-managed reef 
institutions and their relationships to ecosystem health (Cinner et al. 2012, Cinner et al. 
2009 (b), Wamukota et al. 2012, Stevenson and Tissot 2014). These have focused on 
several attributes of co-managed reef institutions that include: institutional rules 
governing access, the boundaries between reef resource users and non-users, the 
decision-making processes of stakeholders, and various sanctions employed for 
enforcement. The novel contributions of this study include significant findings on the 
relationships between reef health and institutional components that include well-
defined leadership roles, internal institutional hierarchies, and day-to-day involvement 
of reef management leaders. In addition to quantitative findings this study seeks to 
contribute qualitative details on institutions that are often inadequately reported 
(Wamukota et al. 2012, Ostrom 2007, Agrawal 2001). This study also deals with the 
often-mentioned problem of multiple possible definitions of successful management. 
Successful management can make for healthy ecosystem outcomes, collaborative social 
institutions, or a combination of both.  By using biophysical reef data, but triangulating it 
with social perceptions and attitudes on reef-based tourism, this study contends with 
the multiple definitions of successful reef management.  
 
2. Study Sites  
Indonesia is the field site for this study because its political system allows for co-
managed institutional frameworks in its villages. There are strict statutory protections 
for reefs at the highest levels of government, yet the real sources of reef governance are 
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community-based management regimes that vary immensely from village to village 
(Christie et al. 2004, Crawford et al. 2004, Halpern 2003, Kittinger 2013, Ross and Wall 
1999). Co-management requires a substantial devolution of power to the local scale. In 
Indonesia’s case, what was once a highly centralized political system, most notably in 
the Suharto dictatorship era, entered a period of devolution policy around resource 
management beginning in 1998, known as the Reformasi. It saw communities and local 
governments, such as regency and provincial governments, gain management authority 
over the resources they depend on for economic livelihoods (Clifton 2003). Devolution is 
also evident in Indonesian coastal laws (such as Law No. 22) that mandate local-level 
management over marine resources from the shoreline to twelve nautical miles from 
shore; this includes nearshore reefs and their fisheries.  
Beyond devolution-oriented public policy, several factors make the enforcement 
of Indonesian national-level reef conservation laws impractical at any scale other than 
local, these include: a persistent lack of funds for implementation, the lack of capacity to 
enforce regulations along its lengthy coast, and corruption at all levels of governance 
(Christie and White 2007, Erdmann 2001, Mous et al, 2000, Pet-Soede and Erdmann 
1998, Pet-Soede et al 1999, Satria et al. 2006). Therefore, a major determinate of 
Indonesia’s ability to co-manage its resources depends on communities’ abilities to 
design institutions at the local level (Pomeroy 1995). Despite its reform efforts, 
Indonesian reefs continue to decline overall (Tun et al. 2008). Data is somewhat patchy, 
yet most of Indonesia’s reefs are now classified as fair, poor, or very poor quality 
(COREMAP).   
The two cases analyzed for this study, Lovina and Pemuteran are located within 
the Buleleng Regency on the northern coastal stretch of Bali, Indonesia. Both villages 
attract thousands of tourists every year spending tens of millions of dollars to visit area 
reefs (see maps in Figures 1 and 2). The case communities have reef tourism economies 
based entirely on the capacity of reef to deliver recreation and tourism ecosystem 
services. The recreational and tourism value of Indonesian reef ecosystem services is a 
significant amount of its overall economic activity (Cesar 2002). Lovina and Pemuteran 
both have village level institutions for reef management. Institutions are formed to 
manage reefs as healthy ecosystems, but they also act as a positive feedback 
mechanism for social-economic wellbeing by encouraging collaborative decision-making 
and relationships among reef stakeholders. There exists a potential synergistic effect 
between enhanced ecosystem service delivery, strong community-based management 
institutions, local agency, and local incomes.  
Certain variables of the case sites were controlled for, these include: 1) both 
villages actively manage nearshore fringe reefs using co-management regimes, 2) both 
communities have suffered comparable levels of reef degradation both in terms of 
intensity and timespans, and have been subjected to the same conservation strategies 
from local and national government, 3) both villages banned commercial and 
recreational fishing on nearshore reefs where tourists are brought to snorkel or dive, 4) 
protected reefs are visible from the village shoreline, an attribute that has been shown 
to increase compliance with conservation measures (McClanahan 2006), 5) the villages 
rely primarily on reef-based tourism for local livelihoods. The key difference is the 
 7 
ecological outcomes of reefs as well as the specific makeup of reef management 
institutions. See table 1 for a comparative summary of both field sites.  
 
Table 1: Comparisons between case sites 
 Lovina  Pemuteran 
Population ~9,000 ~8000 
Size 4 km 2 km 
Per Capita Income (Source: BPS 2013) 643.38 643.38 
Overall Reef Quality Poor to fair Fair to Good 
Tourism begins as a significant level 1988-1989 1990-1991 
Tourism Purpose Marine Mammal watching, Diving, 
Snorkeling, Beaches 
Diving, Snorkeling, Beaches 
Brief description of reef based tourism 
and economic development  
Lovina depends dolphin watching and 
reef tourism that bring around 30,000 
tourists annually. 60% of tourists come 
from the Europe and the U.S. The tourism 
economy is worth $10 million annually 
into Lovina’s economy.  
Pemuteran was one of Bali’s poorest 
villages up until 1990. Since 1989, its land 
prices increased by 400%. Currently, its 
economy depends on diving and its 
rapidly spreading reputation as a world-
class, award-winning destination for reef 
tourism.   
Declaration of protected areas of local 
reef where fishing is prohibited, marked 
by at least one mooring buoy 
1998 1995 
Location of healthy reefs Anturan village nearshore reef, five other 
villages have reefs too degraded to bring 
tourists to visit  
all reefs visible from the shores of 
Pemuteran are healthy 
 
Both case sites fall within a future nationally mandated marine protected 
network currently under review by the Indonesian government and international 
environmental organizations (Nurhayati 2010). Currently, both communities impose 
strict no-take rules on their reefs, making them effective yet small marine protected 
areas. Marine protected areas (MPAs) are recognized globally as the one of the best 
strategies for managing coral reefs (Dodge et al. 2008). MPAs create designated areas 
where harvesting reef species is limited or forbidden, allowing for fish stocks and coral 
cover to recover from damage (National Research Council 2000). Increasingly, 
international environmental organizations, local grassroots groups, and governments 
are advocating that reef communities in developing countries plan, develop, and 
manage their own marine protected areas (Bellwood et al. 2004, Bohnsack 2003, 
Halpern and Warner 2002). Studies show that numbers of MPAs are on the rise in 
Indonesia, where coral reefs are included in 38 of Indonesia's 114 registered MPAs, 12 
of there were newly listed in the last decade (Reef Base 2007). Despite this positive 
trend, less than 3% of Indonesia’s reefs are rated as “effectively managed” underscoring 
the need for improved management frameworks therein (Reef Base 2007).  
Both Pemuteran and Lovina were primarily fishing villages before their tourism 
booms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They transitioned into reef based tourism 
villages in the 1990s. Currently, there is no large or small-scale commercial or 
recreational fishing allowed on the nearshore reefs, through random instances of 
poaching do occur. Village stakeholder institutions have monitoring and enforcement 
protocols to prevent this. All locally owned fishing vessels are required to travel several 
miles off shore when fishing, often brining them into Javanese waters. Thus, the fishing 
sector and its management institutions do not have conflicts of interest with the local 
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MPA. In both villages, graduated sanctions are in place to prevent fishing and to deter 
breaches of rules; sanctions have been shown to increase compliance (Cinner et al 
2012). Since reef reserve areas are visible from the village beach, rule breaking seldom 
occurs. Line and pole fishing by native villagers is permitted for family consumption 
only, and was observed in both in Lovina and in Pemuteran. Studies have shown that 
subsistence based line and pole fishing does not negatively affect ecosystem health 
when measured in targeted species diversity and biomass (McClanahan et al. 2006). 
Both communities have similar timelines of reef destruction and recovery due to 
similar anthropogenic drivers in their development histories. Destructive fishing 
methods such as cyanide poisoning and dynamiting were commonly used in both Lovina 
and Pemuteran from the 1950s up to the 1990s, and it has continued in lesser and 
varying degrees throughout Indonesia into the 2000s (Erdman 2001). In 1985, 
Indonesian Fisheries Law Number 9 prohibited of the use of such methods (Badruddin 
and Gillet 1996, Pet-Soede et al. 1999). Aside from an uptick in illegal dynamiting in the 
region during the Asian financial crisis of 1998, illegal destructive fishing has declined 
substantially. Since the 1980s and 1990s, there has been the greatest decline in users of 
destructive fishing methods who target their home village reefs. Instead, poachers that 
tend to be from distant locations, including the Philippines and Thailand, are responsible 
for destructive fishing methods today. Spare a few isolated incidents; the blasting and 
cyanide fishing have virtually ceased in these case sites thanks to severe legal penalties, 
increased local awareness, enforcement, and graduated sanctions. The case sites 
experienced similar levels of blast fishing destruction early in their development history 
since they are nearby to one another, approximately 45 kilometers apart. They also 
implemented no-take rules on local reefs within three years of one another. Thus, the 
baseline of damages across sites was comparable when management institutions were 
enacted.  
 
Figure 1: Lovina 
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Lovina is actually the name for several adjacent villages that make most of their 
revenue from dolphin watching and reef snorkel tours. This study administered 
stakeholder surveys in the four villages depicted in Figure 1. Lovina’s villages have reefs 
that are visible in near shore waters, with the healthiest reef just off Anturan village. 
This reef is open to all of Lovina’s reef tourism workers to bring boats of tourists for 
snorkeling trips, regardless of their home village. In addition to reef tourism, Lovina 
depends on its well-known dolphin watching tours that bring around 30,000 tourists 
annually, 60% of them from the West, to observe dwarf spinner dolphins (Stenella 
longirostris roseiventris)(Mustika 2011). Dwarf spinners congregate in Lovina to forage 
its near shore reef fisheries. Tourists inject almost $10 million annually into Lovina’s 
economy, with nearly half spent on the dolphin watching tours directly. Lovina also 
depends on snorkel and dive based tourism to a lesser extent, because its reefs are still 
recovering from heavy damage.  
Stakeholders in Lovina around reef tourism include: 1) the reef and dolphin 
tourism institutions. These village level reef management institutions manage access to 
dolphin and reef snorkel tours, their Balinese names include Bhakti Dharma Segara and 
Kharya Bhakti Samudra. All stakeholders involved in reef tourism, such as boat captains, 
guides, and engine repairmen are required to join these organizations. 2) Various 
tourism workers such as hotel owners, restaurant owners, recreational equipment 
rental shop owners, and their employees. 3) Village level leaders, such as the head of 
the village, are involved to a small degree in the decision making of the reef 
management institutions. Their approval over certain management policies often 
involves payment.  
Figure 2: Pemuteran  
 
 
 
Pemuteran is a single village with a large area of local reefs. It generates most of 
its revenue through dive tourism, with its most popular reefs identified in Figure 2. 
Pemuteran was one of Bali’s poorest villages up until 1990. Since 1989, its land prices 
have soared to 400 times what they once were (Savitri 2001). Respondents suggested 
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that this figure is many times higher in 2013. Currently, its economy is expanding as the 
village gains reputation for being a world-class, award-winning destination for reef 
tourism. Besides its natural reefs, it has several BioRock formations, where mineral 
accretion technology is used to enhance coral growth through electric shock. These 
formations are free for tourists to visit, and are within a short swim from the shoreline. 
Facilities for environmental education, such as libraries, and information centers line the 
shore. Tourists are encouraged to learn about how the community acts as a reef 
steward.  
Stakeholders in Pemuteran include 1) The Pecelan Laut: the religious inspired sea 
police who patrol the reef on Saturdays and Sundays for poachers. Hierarchically 
organized, members have different management responsibilities at different levels, and 
membership is highly prestigious in the community. 2) BioRock: an international 
network of coral restoration projects that grow coral at expedited rates using electrical 
charge. BioRock Pemuteran has won awards from various multilateral aid entities for its 
nursery built in 2000. It has a visitor’s center with a library on the main beach. 3) The 
informal network of local hotels: these owners of larger hotels have made investments 
in reef management organizations, spearheaded their own organizational projects, 
sponsored and organized cleanup, and coral restoration. They are well known in the 
community. 4) Village-based management: This includes traditional village leadership 
(i.e. the head of the village plus an elected and appointed staff). 5) Reef Gardeners, 
Turtle Project, and other charities: charities attached to local hotels, primarily 
responsible for invasive species removal and biological monitoring. 6) Various tourism 
workers, such as dive shop technicians, operators, boat captains, tank fillers, hotel 
owners, restaurant owners, and tour package sale point operators.  
 
3. Methods 
This study uses a mixed methods approach, relying on qualitative and 
quantitative analysis (Creswell and Clark 2007). Data collection took place in two phases. 
Phase one began with 73 long form open-ended stakeholder interviews in the summer 
of 2013 from July to August. These interviews were based on an initial literature review 
and were used to elicit further grounded theory on the characteristics of reef 
management institutions (Glaser and Strauss 2009, Strauss and Corbin 1997).  These 
theoretical building blocks of institutions were then used as comparison points in a 
quasi-experiment. This type of research design measures the effects (reef health) after a 
treatment. In this case there are two experimental treatments, they include 1) 
conservation policy outlawing of blast fishing in the 1980s and 2) collaborative 
management institutions at the local scale implementing this policy. Quasi-experiments 
are posited as the best methods for assessing the effects of co-managed institutions on 
natural resource outcomes (Thomas and Koontz 2011).  
Respondents were sampled in a snowball method, where key informants (such 
as local leaders) were asked to recommend other knowledgeable stakeholders to speak 
with. Interviews ranged from one to four hours, and included four focus groups of local 
stakeholders who earn their livelihood from reef tourism. Of the stakeholders surveyed, 
38% were boat captains on vessels they own and operate, 46% work in the dive 
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industry, 8% work in some capacity as reef management organization leadership, 3% 
work in boat maintenance, and the remaining respondents work in a general capacity in 
reef-based tourism. 
Following the interviews, phase two took place from August to September 2013 
where a survey questionnaire was developed that examined six distinct indicators of 
reef management institutions that include: the presence of clear membership 
requirements, internal hierarchies, day-to-day involvement of elected leaders in the 
management institution, transparency and knowledge of the leadership and their 
responsibilities to the institution, whether the leadership helps build capacity in the 
organization, whether all members can be elected as leaders, and whether the 
institution is autonomous or under the influence of elites. These six indicators were 
drawn from the interview phase and from theory on co-management institutions.  
Structured surveys were administered verbally to 113 respondents who were not 
asked to fill in questionnaires. All respondents were able to read them while the author 
recorded their responses. The author conducted these surveys alone, with nearly 80% 
done in English and 20% done in Indonesian upon request. No translator was required, 
spoken English is widespread in these two villages thanks to tourism. Stakeholders in 
both villages were surveyed randomly, in areas where they congregated socially after 
they finished a day of work bringing tourists to the reefs. This random method 
generated a number one to five (n), and surveyed the nth person sitting along the 
benches and tables in these locations.  
A copy of the short questionnaire is listed in Table 2. For each question, also 
included is the name of that variable used in the model outlined below, as well as the 
hypothesized relationship the variable has to reef health.  
 
Table 2: Institutional indicators that predict reef quality  
Survey Question Variable Name Hypothesized Relationship 
Are all reef stakeholders required to join the 
reef management institution? 
boundary When all stakeholders involved in 
reef tourism are required to join, 
health reefs are predicted.    
Is there a defined hierarchy in the 
organization? 
hierarch Well-defined hierarchies predict 
healthier reefs because 
management responsibilities are 
more clearly defined.  
Are the leaders of the reef management 
organization involved with the day-to-day 
operations of reef management? (Clarifying 
question: do your leaders do patrols, remove 
crown of thorns, or do ecological surveys?) 
mgmt 
 
 
 
 
 
When leaders are involved in day-
to-day management tasks such as 
monitoring, there will be healthier 
reefs. This is because stakeholders 
can learn best practices from their 
leaders.  
Do you know who is leading the efforts to 
manage local reefs? (Clarifying question: 
Would everyone say the same name if 
asked?)  
member_aware When institution leaders are well 
known by members, the result is 
healthier reefs. This is because 
management responsibilities are 
more clearly defined.  
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Is the reef management organization 
transparent when it makes decisions? 
transpar When stakeholders know how 
decisions get made, and why 
certain decisions get implemented, 
there are healthier reefs. This is 
because there is greater 
transparency and thus greater buy- 
in.  
Do leaders of reef management 
organizations help educate members and 
improve reef management strategies? 
leader_educ When leaders take an active role in 
helping train and educate 
institution members, there are 
healthy reefs.  
Can any member be elected to the reef 
management organization leadership? 
oppor_elect When there is shared responsibility 
such as the opportunity for any 
member to stand for election, there 
will be healthier reefs.  
Do wealthy or people dictate what happens 
to the reef even if you vote? 
auton1 When stakeholders view 
themselves as autonomous 
managers of the reef, this leads to 
higher reef quality. 
Do hotel owners make decisions or is it the 
organization’s members? 
auton 2 When wealthier stakeholders have 
equal authority over the reef 
decisions to other reef 
stakeholders, there are healthier 
reefs, because more legitimacy is 
perceived and more buy in occurs.  
 
4.0 Analysis 
Using the independent variables in Table 1, a model was developed after several 
combinations of predictor variables were tried. This model predicts a categorical output 
for reef quality Q, expressed as a probability ranging from “poor” to “good” reef status2, 
as a function of 1) boundary, the requirement that all reef tourism operators join the 
institution, 2) hierarch, internal hierarchies, 3) mgmt, day-to-day involvement of elected 
leaders in the management institution, 4) transpar, transparency and knowledge of the 
leadership and their responsibilities to the institution, 5) leader_educ, whether the 
leadership helps build capacity in the organization, 6) oppor_elect, whether all members 
can be elected as leaders, 7) member_aware, where institution members know their 
leaders, and 8) auton1 and auton2, two measurements over whether the institution is 
autonomous.  
The model is conceptualized as follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑄) = 
𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽2 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖ℎ + 𝛽3 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝛽4 𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑖 +
𝛽6 𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽8𝑚𝑖𝑚𝑏𝑖𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑖 +  𝛽7𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑏𝑏1 + 𝛽9𝑏𝑏𝑚𝑏𝑏2 + 𝜀    
 
                                                        2 Based on percent coral cover from UNEP 2005 
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Logistic regression, an increasingly prevalent analytic tool in ecosystem 
management scenarios, was used primarily because of the convenience in terms of 
time, personnel, and financial constraints available for data collection. Its limitations 
have been discussed at length (Cleary and Angel 1984, Pearce and Ferrier 2000). These 
include the requirement that outputs are categorical, and also that distortions can be 
possible when the independent variables are highly correlated with one another. Very 
large sample sizes are typically required to overcome this limitation, but given the time 
and financial constraints, 113 respondents were surveyed.  Given such limitations, 
qualitative data is also used to address model outputs and shape conclusions with 
additional context.  
 
4.1 Triangulation of Dependent Variable 
The categorical dependent variable Reef Quality is derived from a UNEP study 
that measured percent cover of living reef building corals in these two case sites (UNEP 
2005). Reef ecological quality can be defined as maintaining key ecosystem parameters 
such as coral cover (McClanahan et al. 2006). However, there has been some evidence 
that percent cover may not respond to management efforts in the way that other 
biophysical indicators of health may (McClanahan et al. 2006). Percentage hard cover 
coral is a useful indicator of coral health for this study however, because it is a relatively 
inexpensive way to gauge whether large-scale, impactful damages are still occurring to 
the system, such as dynamiting. Coral reef field survey protocols suggest that percent 
cover is a viable economic and ecological indicator of reef health for rapid assessment 
and monitoring needs (Hill and Wilkinson 2004). This is especially true in reef tourism 
scenarios, where visitors expect to see living corals. Large amounts of living coral cover 
also help reefs deliver maximum amount of ecosystem services to communities who 
depend on them for recreation and tourism. Despite criticism, the same critical study 
argues that ecological indicators can be used as long as differences are present when 
comparing across different management institutions (McClanahan et al. 2006). Because 
there is a difference in percent coral cover between Lovina and Pemuteran, with 
limitations noted, it is used here as the indicator for reef health.  
Given the limitations of hard cover, and in order to ensure that both 
socioeconomic and biophysical definitions of successful reef management were used, 
interview and survey questions were used to triangulate the UNEP reef health data to 
determine stakeholder perceptions on village reefs. Interviews assessed whether 
stakeholders brought visitors to nearby reefs. If they did not and instead brought them 
further afield, follow-up questions were asked about why they did not bring tourists to 
reefs. Nearly all of the respondents said it was because the local reefs were not as nice 
for tourists as other options nearby. Table 3 shows the results, which match the 
categorical UNEP data on coral reef health in the two communities in this study. Figure 3 
demonstrates further that the categorical UNEP measurements of coral cover are 
reliable representations of reef ecosystem health, and it shows how stakeholders in 
Pemuteran bring nearly 80% of all tourists to their local reefs, versus just 32% in Lovina. 
From these numbers, conclusions on the substantial differences in recreation and 
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tourism based ecosystem services that each reef system offers their communities can be 
drawn.  
 
Table 3: Stakeholder perceptions on ecosystem health 
Survey Question Variable name  Pemuteran Lovina 
Are the reefs healthy? Enviro_percep 92.45% Yes 28.81% Yes 
7.55% No or I don’t 
know 
71.19% No or I don’t 
know  
 
Figure 3: Perceptions of stakeholders: “Do you bring your tourists to the village reef or 
a reef nearby instead?”  
 
  
 
3.0 Results: Significant Differences in Reef Management Institutional Design   
Table 4 displays the statistically significant institutional variables from the final 
model. Significant variables that serve as predictors of reef quality include 1) boundary, 
if all reef tourism practitioners are required to join, 2) mgmt, day-to-day involvement of 
elected leaders in the management institution, 3) transpar, transparency and 
knowledge of the leadership and their responsibilities to the institution, 4) oppor_elect, 
whether all members can be elected as leaders, and 5) auton1, institutional autonomy.  
 
Table 4: Logistic Regression Results 
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Variable Estimated 
Coefficient  
S.E.  z-score Marginal 
Effects 
boundary -2.50 1.32 -1.89** -0.33 
hierarch -1.94 1.30 -1.49 -0.25 
mgmt -6.06 2.35 -2.58*** -0.74 
member_aware 2.25 1.96 1.15 0.50 
transpar -3.67 1.36 -2.68*** -0.55 
oppor_elect -2.04 1.27 -1.61* -0.33 
auton1 0.54 1.37 0.40  0.10 
auton2 2.92 1.41 2.07**  0.53 
Constant 7.56 2.91 2.59***  n/a 
 
Pseudo R-squared: 0.84 
Likelihood Ratio Test Chi-2: 129.94 (6 df , p-value 0.000) 
Total Observations: N=112 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Significant at =0.1 
**Significant at=0.05 
***Significant at=0.01 
 
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics derived from the survey questions, and sorted by 
case community (with reef quality labeled). Statistically significant predictors of reef 
quality are indicated with asterisks.  
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics from Surveys   
Survey Question Variable Name Results Lovina (ailing reefs) Results Pemuteran (healthy 
reefs) 
Are there clear member versus non-
member boundaries 
boundary** 
 
92 % Yes  56 %   Yes 
8 % No  44 % No  
Is there a defined hierarchy in the 
organization? 
hierarch   94 % Yes 49 % Yes 
6% No 51 % No 
Are the leaders of the reef 
management organization involved  
with the day-to-day operations of reef 
management? 
mgmt*** 
 
98 %  Yes 31 % 
 
Yes 
 
2 % No 69 % No 
Do you know who is leading the efforts 
to manage local reefs? 
member_aware 88 % Yes 90 % Yes 
11 % No 10 % No 
Is the reef management organization 
transparent when it makes decisions? 
transpar*** 91 %  
 
Yes 29 %   Yes 
9 % No 72 %    No 
Do leaders of reef management 
organizations help educate members in 
order to improve reef management 
strategies? 
leader_educ 90 %  Yes 17 % Yes 
9 % No 83 % No 
can any member be elected to the reef 
management organization leadership? 
oppor_elect* 87 % Yes 46 % 
 
Yes 
 
13 % No 54 %    No 
Wealthy people are the ones with real 
power in this community, the reef 
management organization comes 
second. 
auton1  21 % Agree  84 % Agree 
79 % Disagree 15%       Disagree 
Hotel owners are the ones with real 
power in this community, the reef 
auton 2** 32 %  Agree 76 % 
 
Agree 
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management organization comes 
second. 
67.92%  
 
Disagree 23 % 
 
Disagree 
 
Total Observations: N=112 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*Significant at =0.1 
**Significant at=0.05 
***Significant at=0.01 
 
3.0 Findings 
Section 3.0 is a brief summary of the findings of the quantitative results displayed in 
tables 4 and 5 above. These will be discussed in greater detail in sections 3.1-3.3 with 
the inclusion of qualitative interview data for explanatory purposes. The statistically 
significant variables have been grouped into three main categories of findings: 
 
Organizational Boundaries: Requiring all reef tourism practitioners to be members of 
the institution does not predict healthier reef outcomes, contrary to what was 
hypothesized. These organizational boundaries have important relationships to ideas on 
organizational autonomy as their presence impacts the amount of control that elites 
(wealthy hotel and business owners) have over reef making decisions. More autonomy 
and independence of the management institution from well-connected elites also did 
not predict healthier reefs as was hypothesized.  
 
A clearly defined hierarchy: A near universal familiarity with the hierarchy and 
leadership structure among members did not predict healthier reefs. This meant that 
high degrees of familiarity with their fellow stakeholders and the institutional inner 
workings did not predict healthier reefs. Institutional leaders with high degrees of day-
to-day involvement in the reef management institution also did not predict healthy 
reefs, despite the assumption that the primary role of leaders is to help build 
educational and technical capacity that would result in healthy reefs.  
 
Transparency: Transparent institutions did not predict healthy reefs. These three 
findings are summarized in table 5 below: 
 
Table 6: Summary of findings & key differences in institutional design 
 
 
 
 
 
Organizational Boundaries 
well defined and the 
management organizations 
are autonomously managing 
the reef 
Hierarchies are well defined 
where people know their 
leaders, and leaders have 
high levels of day to day 
involvement  
Reef management decision-
making is considered 
transparent by stakeholders 
Lovina (poor reefs) Yes Yes Yes 
Pemuteran (healthy reefs) No No No 
 
3.1 Membership Requirements and its relationship to Autonomy 
According to similar studies, one of the most important institutional 
characteristics of successful versus non-successful reef management institutions has to 
do with the rules that govern membership. These rules specify how membership is 
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achieved, delineate who is required to have membership, and help avoid a free rider 
problem within the reef management institution (Cinner et al. 2009 (b), Cinner et al. 
2012, Ostrom 2005, Stevenson and Tissot 2014). If membership is mandatory for all reef 
users, problems of free ridership are solved, and healthier reefs are hypothesized. If 
membership was optional and criteria to join were vague, reefs of poorer quality were 
expected. The two cases in this study present an unexpected situation where the 
hypothesized relationship is reversed, and membership standards are informal in the 
community with high quality reefs. In Pemuteran, those involved in the reef tourism 
economy are not all required to be members of the main reef management institution. 
Membership is instead voluntary and self-selected.  
The informal membership rules of Pemuteran’s reef management organization 
reveal several of its unique attributes as a common pool resource management 
institution. The Pecelan Laut, as the institution is named, roughly translating to “sea 
police” is more of a combined social club, religious group, and esteemed village level 
cultural phenomenon than it is a common pool resource institution governing a local 
resource. Stakeholders consistently identified the group as the main reef management 
organization, but acknowledged that the actual decision-making authority was held by 
tourism elites, defined here as hotel or resort owners who have invested in at least one 
high profile conservation effort in the village. TEs are visible figures in the village, well 
known to all local stakeholders, as their businesses are major sources of local 
employment. TEs are known in Pemuteran for implementing conservation efforts, 
funding enforcement, spearheading restoration programs, and behind-the-scenes 
financial payoffs of village leadership and local politicians that result in conservation.  
Stakeholders in Pemuteran’s healthy reef system did not perceive their reef 
management organization to be as autonomous as much of the promotional material 
would suggest to visitors. Instead, many argued that TEs still have authority over 
resource management decisions. In the words of one dive industry worker, regarding 
organizational autonomy: 
 
It is mostly for show, the idea of a “community-based” organization. At the end of the day, resort owners 
are in charge. Look at the people who bought hotels here in the 1980s. That is who is really in charge. They 
have the money, they have to bribe local officials for us, and they bribe the head of the village too. 
Conditions on the reef are good and tourists come. Their effort isn’t bad. These owners are really good 
people, It’s good for us, good for the environment. But it is not what I would call “community-based.”   
 
A majority of respondents stated that TEs tend to impact reef conservation 
decisions through payoffs to local decision-makers, noting that this is somewhat normal 
in Indonesian governance. Given the end result is the remarkable comeback of 
Pemuteran’s reefs, the lack of autonomy of the local management authority is hard to 
criticize. Yet some stakeholders worried, saying “eco-conscious resort owners cannot 
live there forever,” casting doubt on the long-term resilience of this regime. Others 
argued that, although TEs manage reefs in a “behind the scenes” top-down pattern 
now, increasingly real power would incrementally shift to the Pecelan Laut. When it 
does shift, their burden will be eased through local and regional mindset-change 
regarding destructive and illegal fishing, which is showing promising decline. The 
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community has, in the past decade, seen the economic potential of an ecologically 
minded tourism approach, including how visitors are willing to pay more to stay in a 
community with strong stewardship credentials over its reefs. The synergistic effects of 
eco-tourism in Pemuteran mean that reef conservation is perceived as synonymous with 
local wealth generation in the minds of villagers. Thus, even if TEs retire and move away, 
some say the regime will continue as is.  
Citing their lack of real decision-making autonomy is not to say that the 
Pemuteran Pecelan Laut lacks legitimacy or village-wide admiration. The Pecelan Laut is 
a source of great pride for many stakeholders. Its members tend to be highly respected, 
relatively prosperous young men who “had a place for the reef in their hearts” as one 
member put it. Members typically congregate in traditional dress at the beachfront 
office (See Figure 4), where they encourage tourists to visit, make donations, ask 
questions, and buy souvenirs. These villagers are there to make the socio-economic links 
between village life and reef health apparent to visitors, even when real management 
authority and capacity is quite limited.  
For example, one stakeholder remarked that the Pecelan Laut perform 
monitoring patrols every Saturday and Sunday to ensure the safety of the reef. He then 
quipped, “If the bad guys know you are coming, they will not be poaching on Saturday 
and Sunday. They will poach on Monday.” Others echoed a similar sentiment, 
suggesting that the real purpose of the Pecelan Laut was to drink coffee and smoke 
cigarettes on the beach. Most importantly, Pemuteran’s healthy reefs and its global 
reputation for sustainable development would suggest that the Pecelan Laut’s self 
perceptions as autonomous leaders in reef management may matter more than actual 
autonomy over decision making around the reef. These self perceptions combined with 
their elite status in the community are possibly more significant than veritable decision-
making autonomy in common pool resource management.  
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Figure 4: Pecelan Laut in their shorefront office in Pemuteran 
 
 
 
Despite its ailing reefs, Lovina’s reef management organizations have mandatory 
membership for anyone operating a boat for reef tourism purposes. Members pay 
required monthly dues in the form of a percentage of earnings, and readily acknowledge 
that this is to avoid free riders benefiting from their hard work protecting the reefs. This 
demonstrates local understanding of the ideas behind common pool resource 
management theory. Stakeholders use dues for insurance and for infrastructure 
upgrades such as mooring buoy replacements on local snorkel and dive spots. Members 
exhibited a large degree of familiarity with one another.  
Interviews suggested universal membership requirements and strong 
interpersonal relationships caused strong buy-in in the local management institutions. It 
also allowed stakeholders to create what they perceived as a fair, limited, and organized 
access system to the reef, called antrean in Balinese. This system ensured that that all of 
the village’s boats would not be on the reef or performing marine mammal tours 
simultaneously, and instead, a rigid turn-taking system was in place so as not to 
overcrowd. This ensured not only that boat captains would not steal one another’s 
business, but also that tourists would not feel as if locals overcrowded the reefs. 
Graduated sanctions are in place to ensure rule breaking did not occur, and similar 
studies have shown these to be very effective (Wamukota et al. 2012). Respondents 
recalled times they had experienced sanctions as experiences they did not want to 
repeat. Labeled scorcing these sanctions would include several weeks where their 
engine would be confiscated by the management institution to prevent them from 
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making trips to the reefs with tourists. The threat of scorcing was considered such an 
immense blow to their income, that high levels of inter-personal trust were evident. In 
other words, scorcing was so severe that stakeholders trusted their peers were 
following the rules.  
 
3.2 Leadership, Hierarchy, and Capacity Building  
 
Similar studies have demonstrated a link between healthy ecological outcomes, 
co-managed institutions, and well-defined leadership within the institution (Pomeroy 
1995). This study finds that a formalized and well-known hierarchy within reef 
management institutions does not necessarily predict healthier reefs, contrary to what 
was hypothesized. In Pemuteran, leadership within the Pecelan Laut was a respected 
position, somewhat ceremonial position, awarded to a highly respected member of the 
community who played a role in blocking poachers in the village’s early days. Yet, many 
stakeholders, despite citing the Pecelan as the main reef management institution, did 
not recognize their leader as one of the main reef management leaders. Many instead 
cited the owners of local resorts as such leaders along with other TEs. The difference 
between what was hypothesized and what was observed means that democratically 
elected leaders are not always predictors of healthier reefs in all cases. Leaders with 
strong local clout and a history of reef conservation advocacy, like Pemuteran’s TEs, are 
equally important in forming successful institutions.  
Lovina on the other hand had stakeholders who nearly unanimously named a 
single organizational leader, and the leaders of organizations in the other villages that 
constitute Lovina. Furthermore, every member of the organization is expected and 
encouraged to lead the organization at one point in his career. Heads of reef 
management institutions in four of Lovina’s six villages unanimously touted this 
opportunity for leadership as a source of legitimacy among members, saying that 
ultimately serving in this capacity means you have all the more reason to respect the 
current leadership. Respondents argued that transparency, trust, and pervasive feelings 
of ownership among stakeholders were linked to the possibility that they too could be 
the leader one day.  
Figures 6 and 7: Lovina Reef Management Stakeholders next to their vessels 
 21 
 
 
 
 
Lovina has a large degree of day-to-day involvement of its reef management 
leaders. This increases organizational capacity, as a large amount of these day-to-day 
duties involve training and education efforts. Thus, Lovina possesses the capacity to 
coordinate a well-financed and innovative effort at conservation similar to those used to 
restore the reefs of Pemuteran. In Pemuteran’s early days of development, the TEs 
brought large amounts of financial capital to Pemuteran in order to invest in restoring 
the reefs shortly after the Indonesian government banned destructive fishing in the late 
1980s. They invested in innovative mineral accretion technology to restore the reef at a 
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rapid rate using electrical charge, and then marketed this technology as a tourist 
attraction. Well-connected leaders seeking to finance these types of efforts are not 
present in Lovina, with the capital levels required for upfront investment presently 
unavailable. Similar investments to those made in Pemuteran’s early days could meet 
comparable results in Lovina because of the large degree of organizational capacity 
evidenced in its participatory, collaborative institutions already in place. 
Two caveats exist however relating to innovative technology based coral 
restoration technology. The first is that its drawbacks include the need for living corals 
to be harvested in order to “seed” growth on the charged lines. Many stakeholders in 
Pemuteran, especially those working in dive shops not affiliated with this technology, 
said that despite attracting awards, accolades, and visitors, they were skeptical of 
mineral accretion technology’s true restorative capacities. Many said they view the 
technology as an attraction geared towards eco-tourists that, unbeknownst to them, 
causes living stands of branching coral to be extracted from the healthy reefs.  
Those on the other side of the debate say that despite harvesting living coral, 
more coral is grown and ultimately “replanted” on the reefs. More importantly, 
supporters argue that these efforts are only partially inspired by best reef restoration 
practice, and the real reason is to change local mindsets around reef stewardship in 
order to make it intrinsic to Pemuteran’s way of life. The second caveat is that reef 
survival is intrinsically linked to land use land planning decisions made on property 
adjacent to the reefs. Poor land use planning results in sediment runoff that inhibits 
coral growth and survival. In the past ten years, many of the buyers of beachfront hotels 
in Lovina have been Western Europeans who do not relocate to Lovina and instead own 
the investment property remotely. The Pemuteran model is quite different, and includes 
a history of Australian, English, and Indonesian TEs investing in conservation efforts and 
acting as local conservation champions over a period of decades. This cannot be so 
easily replicated in Lovina under these land use and development conditions.   
 
3.3 Transparency  
Greater transparency in decision-making was hypothesized to occur in 
communities with healthier reefs. Surprisingly, this study found that transparent 
management decision-making was present in Lovina, but somewhat absent in 
Pemuteran. Similar studies highlight the importance of transparency in common pool 
resource management (Cinner et al. 2009 (b), Berkes 2011, Ostrom 2005, Stevenson and 
Tissot 2014, Wamukota et al 2012), but tend to focus on transparency and 
accountability for rule enforcement relating to rules that govern access to the resource. 
This study conceptualizes accountability somewhat differently: how well stakeholders 
can map the act of decision-making and the subsequent process of implementation. In 
other words, if members want some aspect of reef management changed, can they 
raise the issue within the institution, vote on it, and see it implemented? Can they trace 
management issues from the point where they enter the agenda to implementation? 
The alternative model is one where reef management decisions are made and imposed 
from the top down.  
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In Lovina, despite poor quality reefs, stakeholders can universally outline the 
process for making and implementing policy changes to the reef management regime. 
They outlined a process where a monthly meeting was held, issues could be raised by 
any member, voted upon, and then enacted using funds created by membership dues. 
Pemuteran on the other hand saw some stakeholders able to describe the decision-
making process, and others unable to do so. Even some elite dive business owners could 
not describe how decisions were made and policies were implemented. Some attributed 
decision-making and implementation to TEs, and others to the Pecelan Laut. 
Transparency therefore is not a firm predictor of reefs when defined in this way, and 
should be conceptualized more broadly other studies on reef management.  
Another notable difference related to transparency was observed in the way that 
villages promoted and marketed their efforts to manage local reefs to visitors and 
tourists. This has not yet been discussed in co-management management literature on 
coral reefs. Pemuteran publicizes its reef management institution and its local reef-
focused NGOs to its visitors, which was repeatedly observed to resonate positively with 
tourists, and has been shown repeatedly to win conservation awards at national and 
international levels.  It is mainly the Pecelan Laut who emphasize and communicate the 
community-oriented aspects of their reef management organization. This is not the case 
in Lovina as there is no mention of its community-based management in any form to 
visitors. The office is difficult to find, marked in Balinese, and with limited hours of 
operation. There is a large sign advertising Lovina’s reef organizations centrally located 
on the village beach, however it is also written exclusively in in Balinese. The behind-
the-scenes work that Lovina’s villagers put into their management institution is largely 
invisible to tourists, along with their group-wide efforts at managing reefs for ecosystem 
health and their remarkable knowledge of the ecosystem. Typically, to speak with a reef 
management leader, one would need to find them at home in residential areas where 
tourists tend to not visit.  
Figure 8: Advertisement in Balinese for the local management institution 
 24 
 
Since stakeholders in Lovina do not publicize their complex, democratic reef 
management organizations to their visitors, they effectively forgo a value added benefit 
from a type of en vogue ecotourism, where increasingly visitors are concerned with the 
ethics behind their Southeast Asian eco-tourism experience (Mustika et al. 2003). One 
Lovina reef management leader displayed a photo in his home where he was receiving 
an award on behalf of the local organization from former Indonesian Prime Minister 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, an important environmental accolade that was not made 
visible to visitors. As a result, there was an observably greater adversarial relationship 
between Lovina’s tourists compared to Pemuteran’s. Lovina tourists were looking for 
the lowest prices, and villagers looking to fill up their boats for snorkel tours. This means 
that tourists are not visiting reefs with full knowledge of the socio-economic links 
between Lovina’s village life and the local reefs. They are not willing to pay more to 
ensure that locals have incentives to keep reefs healthy, as they are willing to do in 
Pemuteran where the village-reefs-livelihoods link is made explicit to tourists. There 
were many observed instances where a notable difference in Western tourists’ 
willingness to accept higher fares occurred when they knew villagers are working 
collectively towards reef sustainability. Interviews with tourists nearly unanimously 
suggested that if they had known of the effort in Lovina, they would have donated to 
their reef management institution. Lovina’s local organizations are truly autonomous 
and in the hands of the community, yet they have not received the types of acclaim, 
awards, and recognition by multilateral institutions that Pemuteran does. This could be 
due to the fact that its reefs remain degraded, and that the need to market this kind of 
socioeconomic relationship to the ecological system is not well known.  
 25 
This additional income could be useful to Lovina reef stakeholders who nearly 
unanimously lamented the uncertainty that characterizes their lives based on reef 
tourism. The most significant source of uncertainty in Lovina is the persistent low 
income of reef tourism stakeholders. Given increasing regional fuel prices, unwieldy 
impacts of stochastic events on the tourist economy such as large storms, and the 
impending havoc of climate change and warming oceans, this uncertainty will not 
diminish in the near future. If Lovina were to publicize its community-based efforts to 
manage its reefs democratically and to be more transparent about the planning it does 
around reef management, the community could attract greater revenue. This could be 
used for enhancing critical infrastructure, such as mooring points on reefs. It could also 
be used to implement technological fixes that quicken the pace of coral recovery.  
Differing development trajectories toward a tourism-based economy also played 
an important role, according to stakeholder perceptions, on whether reefs improved or 
remained degraded. A key piece of Pemuteran’s development trajectory was shaped by 
top down decision making over conservation that resulted in the healthy reef outcomes 
today. In the 1980s, when regional reef recovery and tourism first began, a small 
number of respected TEs in Pemuteran collaboratively devised a development strategy. 
Their vision focused on deliberate, slow growth that framed Pemuteran as a diver’s 
paradise for those with an ecological conscience in need of an off-the-grid excursion. 
Growth occurred very differently in Lovina. Beginning in the 1980s, published travel 
guides described Lovina’s villages as “paradise,” located off the beaten tourist path. The 
result was a dramatic increase in tourism that occurred, according to many 
stakeholders, “over night.” Hotel and facility construction was unable to keep pace with 
its influx of tourists. More accessible connections to the major tourist cities in the south 
of Bali meant that a simple trip connected busloads of tourists to Lovina’s well-marketed 
black sand beaches and dolphin tours. Whereas there are hourly shuttles to and from 
Lovina from Bali’s main tourist cities, travel to Pemuteran requires improvisation. One 
informant stated a possible cause in the difference between reef systems is due to the 
“travel guide book phenomenon” where Lovina, in its early days, received many 
mentions in travel guides while Pemuteran did not. A few TEs said that they asked 
editors of such guides to keep them out on purpose, saying they did not want to 
become the next Lovina.  
With a much slower transition into tourism, and a slow payoff, one would expect 
Pemuteran’s villagers to experience difficulty linking reef health and increasing revenue 
(McClanahan and Davies 2005). While the link between the healthy ecosystem and the 
healthy economy slowly became evident, covert violations of no-take rules, destructive 
anchoring bans, and destructive methods fell rapidly. Increasing numbers of locals 
began to work in the tourism industry, leaving behind fishing. Conservation became a 
social norm. This transition was possible because locals were buttressed by well-
financed TEs, who were able to pay off village leaders, community groups, fishermen, 
and politicians to make them more amenable to reef conservation. TEs reported buying 
the fishers out, paying them a lump sum to no longer fish the reef. Thus, the early days 
of Pemuteran resembled an informal, locally financed “payments for ecosystem 
services” scheme (Engel et al. 2008). TEs provided the payments, in a legal manner or 
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otherwise, to people who could prevent reef degradation. Most importantly, they also 
provided jobs and actively encouraged those with livelihoods that threatened the reef 
to transition into tourism. Wages rose, and more people were employed through time 
as Pemuteran grew. These same TEs began to form several local environmental NGOs 
responsible for restoring the reef, these include BioRock, Reef Gardeners, and the Turtle 
Project. 
This de-facto payment for environmental services scheme, increased 
employment, and increased environmental consciousness, allowing one-time extractive 
reef users to transition into the tourism economy. Thus, the contemporary need for a 
management institution dedicated to enforcement is less pronounced. One TE 
mentioned how in the 1980s, his resort was nearly razed to the ground by a dozen 
fishermen intending to poach the reef using cyanide. He drove them off through threats 
of force, and by phoning his friends in the Indonesian army. He and others claimed that 
information about these types of events traveled by word of mouth, albeit slowly, and 
Pemuteran gained gradually reputation as a reef where poachers would not be 
tolerated.  In the words of another TE: 
It was slow work, it takes time. If Lovina had taken more time, they would look more like us [in 
Pemuteran]. There were tourists snorkeling, trampling, and fishing their reef when we were 
rebuilding ours from tatters. Literally fighting poachers off of it. For decades Government wasn’t 
here. Village leadership was moderately dependable, when you paid them off. We chased them 
off through hard, hard work. I can’t say I’d have it in me to do it again.  
 
4. Discussion 
 The findings above both support and contradict several key studies on co-
managed reefs. Cinner and Huchery 2014 examine 42 case sites in a comparative 
fashion spanning Kenya, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia. Their analysis 
looks at the relation between social outcomes (livelihood satisfaction and compliance) 
and the number of rules, the makeup of the rules, and the specific type of co-
management framework (whether the case is a national park, traditionally managed, or 
locally-managed MPA). They found that stakeholders in traditionally managed systems, 
and local co-managed systems tended to see great benefit to their own livelihoods in 
the sustainable management of local reefs, while stakeholders in devolved, locally 
managed frameworks did not share this perception. Views of the Lovina stakeholders in 
this study conflict with these results however. Lovina stakeholders, despite their locally-
initiated, devolved, co-managed framework without any outside NGO presence still 
viewed the efforts of the community based reef management institution as having 
direct positive impacts on their livelihoods. This study’s findings in Pemuteran 
supported the findings of Cinner and Huchery 2014, as this village presents a case of 
locally developed protected areas, in conjunction with civil society and government 
partners. Stakeholders there also, as predicted, viewed the efforts of the management 
institution as beneficial for local livelihoods.   
 A similar study on co-managed reefs in Raja Ampat, Indonesia 
(Dirhamsyah 2013) suggests that NGOs are a critical ingredient for success, in addition 
to government support across scales, and local political will. There is evidence for this 
idea in this study, since Pemuteran had assistance from several NGOs, critical in grant 
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writing and applying for various awards. Notoriety, outside financing, and capacity 
building were noticeably missing in the Lovina case, where there were no NGOs present 
to assist the local management institutions. It is very important to note however that in 
many instances in Pemuteran, where there was a strong NGO presence, certain 
stakeholders heavily criticized the NGO activities as interference. Mulrennan et al. 2012 
has summarized some of these complaints in their study: [NGOs care more about the] 
“response to the demands of donor and other external agents, [and] fundamental 
principles of social justice and community empowerment were sidelined in favour of 
externally determined conservation agendas (see Chapin 2004 for examples).”  Even 
some TEs criticized the efforts of certain NGOs as striving for awards and recognition, 
while other NGOs were working hard on day-to-day management (such as crown of 
thorns removal).  
Similarly, Berkes 2011 Draws a distinction between community based 
management that develops spontaneously in the community, and management that 
develops at the behest of outsiders, friendly and helpful as they may be to the socio-
ecological systems. Many of the TEs in this study were outsiders who spent decades 
living, working, and investing in sustainable social, economic, and ecological outcomes 
of Pemuteran’s reef system. That said, should their contributions to healthy reef 
outcomes be questioned because they were not born into the village itself? Are the non-
Indonesian TEs different from Indonesian TEs when conceptualizing the community 
despite comparable time and financial investment in local conservation? These are the 
complicated questions that institutional analysis helps side step, by re-directing the 
focus of the analysis to institutional makeup. But these questions still remain. In this 
study, many of Pemuteran’s stakeholders were overwhelmingly grateful to TEs, and 
many were also very critical of their real intentions. These criticisms often focused on 
whether TEs were winning awards at the expense of engaging in day-to-day 
conservation work.  
This study did not test for certain variables effects on reef health that have been 
shown in other similar studies to not be statistically significant. These include: multiple 
income levels in the villages, involvement in decision-making, mean years of education, 
and proportion of the community in alternative occupations such as farming 
(McClanahan et al 2006). Other studies have shown that frequent reminders of the 
benefits of conservation tend to promote collective action around conserving the reef 
(McClanahan et al. 2006). In the case of Pemuteran, this can be evidenced in the 
frequencies of awards and recognition this community has received since the early 90s, 
and thus the findings in this study support the importance of the need for continuing 
social cues that remind stakeholders of the benefits of conservation.  
In a similar study (Cinner et al. 2009 (b)) examines and compares reef 
management institutions in Kenya and Madagascar. Their design and theorized 
institutional components are similar to the ones used in this study. They make a notable 
point regarding a potential criticism for this kind of research: comparative research on 
institutional components may lead to a one size fits all or blue-print interpretation of 
results. In other words, practitioners and communities may read studies like these and 
then try and impose institutions on communities based on the findings presented here 
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and in similar studies. The findings in this study support this argument made by Cinner 
et al. 2009. A major takeaway from the findings presented here is that certain theorized 
components of successful management institutions may not always predict reef quality. 
Thus, a heterogeneous view of reef institutional design is necessary depending on the 
livelihood needs and development trajectories of individual communities.  
 
5.0 Conclusion 
Successful reef management is a product of institutions combined with 
development trajectory, local livelihood concerns, and communication of local efforts to 
visitors.  Much of Pemuteran’s remarkable reef recovery is due to its early, innovative, 
ad hoc payments for ecosystem service programs. The critical difference between these 
communities is the up-front capital that has allowed Pemuteran to rapidly regenerate 
much of its reef building coral through innovative technology. Community members 
who hold the respect of villagers have a large degree of influence on reef management, 
whether or not they are elected to a management organization. Perhaps the 
democratically elected leaders of Lovina’s cooperatives can harness their legitimacy in 
order to gain the funding and capacity to create payment for ecosystem services 
schemes in their villages, that fit local needs. They have already established organized, 
democratic, legitimate cooperatives. The next step would be acquiring funding to 
replicate Pemuteran’s success.    
Several institutional attributes that are commonly linked to healthy ecosystems 
were found in this study to not predict reef health. These include: requirement of all 
reef stakeholders to have membership in the institution, institution-wide familiarity with 
leaders, day-to-day involvement of leaders in management, and transparent decision-
making and implementation. These findings are not the major takeaway however; 
instead it is that there are no one-size fits all models for reef management institutions. 
Instead, individual communities must collaboratively manage their resources in ways 
that fit their own unique relationships to the tourists who visit their reefs, their 
relationships between fellow reef stakeholders, and that community’s particular 
economic development history.  
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